Executive summary

This report and public submission together with appended reports on specific functions describes and discusses the work of the Electoral Commission during the 2005 election.  This main report responds to the question from the Justice and Electoral Committee on the clarity of existing provisions.  [The package is also available as .pdf downloads under Downloads to the right.]

Three such broad issues are identified in this report and discussed briefly:

• funding of election campaigns
• campaign rules, including issues of clarity
• electoral management body structure.

These three issues are ones that the Electoral Commission has raised in relation to previous elections.  All have been forcibly addressed in previous JEC reports of general election inquiries and recommendations were made but no further action has been taken. Aspects of a combined electoral management body were also raised in the review of the 2004 local authority elections.

New Zealand parties receive funding from the broadcast allocation fund and parliament (for those with seats).  A number of problems have been highlighted by the Controller and Auditor-General and aspects of the election campaign.  In Australia and Canada parties receive state funding for their election campaign based upon, respectively, the number of votes they receive and the amount of money they spent.  Decisions on party and campaign funding need to consider ideas of equality of access, public information, ease of compliance, and the needs of the MMP context.

New Zealand campaign rules are complex and have not been adapted to the MMP context.  Campaign rules became one of the news stories during and after the election, as well as the subject of civil and potential criminal proceedings.  An alternative is to have one, simple definition and regime applying to election campaign material and campaigning which is applied to everyone in the election, potentially including campaigning by third parties.  Decisions on campaign rules need to consider ideas of clarity, equality of access, ease of compliance and the needs of the MMP context.

There are three agencies involved in general elections in New Zealand.  Numerous problems with this situation have been recognised by the agencies and several different inquiries.  A single peak elections management body is common internationally.  In Australia the body is equivalent to an Independent Crown entity.  In the UK the electoral management body is akin to an Officer of Parliament.  Decisions on the structure of an electoral management body need to consider both democratic and public management standards.

Two specific issues are raised relating to the function-specific reports: tardy compliance for broadcaster and party election expense returns, and budget certainty and phasing for future election information campaigns.

Structure of this report

This report and its attachments fulfil three related roles:

• reporting to parliament on the specific roles of the Electoral Commission during the 2005 general election: conduct of education and information; allocation,  payment and oversight of the broadcasting allocation; receipt of broadcaster election programme returns and party election expense returns.
• responding to specific questions that the Justice and Electoral Committee (JEC) wished to have answered. From that list the only one that relates to the work of the Electoral Commission is ‘discuss the clarity of the provisions regarding election expenses’.
• making a public submission to the JEC  on those broad issues relating to electoral law that the Electoral Commission considers are in need of review.

The Electoral Commission has published a report on each our three specific roles and also on the levels of public understanding of MMP.  A copy of each report is attached.  Two specific issues arise from these reports that need to be considered by the JEC and they are outlined at the end of this report.

The issues that the Electoral Commission has identified as needing consideration are intrinsic to electoral administration and law rather than specific to the 2005 election. Three such broad issues are identified in this report and discussed briefly:

• funding of election campaigns
• campaign rules, including issues of clarity
• elections management body structure.

None of these issues is new and all have been raised by the Electoral Commission in the past and been discussed by previous JEC election inquiries. 

For each of the three broad issues we have provided a very brief summary of the principles involved, the New Zealand situation, some overseas experience and an assessment of some options.

These brief summaries do not contain recommendations.  At the start of the review process we felt that it was more helpful to provide a brief summary that outlined the concepts central to any choices that may be made.

Further information and discussion can be provided on any of the issues covered in this report.

Statistical information from the New Zealand Election Study, which surveyed more than 2,000 people, will be provided to the JEC when analysis is complete.  The Electoral Commission funded the inclusion of questions relevant to the review of the election and will be able to report on public understanding of MMP, levels of political participation, together with views on proportionality, coalition government, Māori seats, democracy, and state funding of parties.

Previous inquiries and recommendations

The three issues are ones that the Electoral Commission has raised in relation to previous elections.  All have been forcibly addressed in previous JEC reports of general election inquiries and recommendations were made but no further action has been taken.  These issues come under what the JEC report of the inquiry into the 2002 election termed a ‘fundamental review of the electoral Act 1993’:

JEC report of the inquiry into the 2002 election, recommendations to government:

• that it undertake a fundamental review of the law relating to parliamentary elections and that this review be completed … We would envisage that the Justice and Electoral Committee would have a role in that review.(I.7A, p3)

7. After consideration, we concluded it would be more useful if a fundamental review of the Electoral Act 1993 was undertaken so that any changes to the legislation could be put in place for the 2008 General Election.  We believe the Government should undertake this review, taking account of the need for appropriate consultation with the public and with the committee.  The review should include the possible reform of:

• electoral organisational structures
• State funding
• election broadcasting rules
• party donations disclosure regime
• the Electoral Act 1993 to include Part 6 of the Broadcasting Act 1989
• a common start date for broadcasting of all types of election programmes
• Part 6 of the Broadcasting Act 1989 to include a procedure for establishing the start date for opening addresses
• the taxation status of political parties.

8. We recognise this recommendation represents a major resource and legislative commitment but we endorse the view of the Election Framework Taskforce [inset paragraph, below].  We consider the present piecemeal nature of changes to the electoral provisions is no longer sustainable and it is time for a substantive review of these provisions.  In particular, we concur with the view of the Electoral Commission expressed after the 1996 General Election that ‘the current system of allocating time and funds to political parties for election broadcasting is unfair and unsatisfactory, and that the procedures required by the [Broadcasting] Act are very time-consuming, cumbersome and expensive.’  (I.7A, p9)

…the comments made in 2001 by the Government’s Election Framework Taskforce that the cycle of select committee inquiry, Government response and legislative change: hampers the effective planning and preparation of the electoral agencies. It reduces the chances of legislative changes actually being passed, which frustrates all of those – Ministers, officials and select committee members – who have worked to develop solutions to past problems. And it reduces the likelihood that any agency is going to develop more than piecemeal change to the individual provisions that have caused a recent problem. The result is an Electoral Act riddled with ad hoc fixes and additions, and very limited capacity in the system to consider the overall effect of the changes being made.  (I.7A, p6)

Funding of election campaigns

New Zealand parties receive funding from the broadcast allocation fund and parliamentary support (in the case of parliamentary parties).  A number of problems have been highlighted.

In Australia and Canada parties receive state funding for their election campaign based, respectively, upon the number of votes they receive and the amount of money they spent.

Decisions on party and campaign funding need to consider ideas of equality of access, public information, ease of compliance, and the needs of the MMP context.

Factors to consider

 

The Democratic Audit, the main international assessment of democracy framework, lists the four principles that must be met by democratic frameworks to be:

• popular control over public decision-making

   

• political equality in exercising that control

   

• the principle of deliberative democracy [informed debate]

   

• the principle of human rights and civil liberties.

   

In relation to election campaign funding these principles are met when laws and practice work to ensure:

• minimal barriers for those wishing to contest the election including equal access to means of communicating with voters and ease of compliance

   

• public information on the source of funding for all campaigning and on how the money was used

   

• prevention of the subordination of parties to special interests

   

• minimal restrictions on individual rights to freedom of expression and access to information

   

• public confidence that those contesting the election comply with the rules and will be caught and sanctioned if they break them.  Coherence of all related rules assists this aim.

   

In the MMP context regulations need to fully integrate the philosophy of a proportional, party-based, multi-party electoral system and parliament.  The Electoral Act 1993 basically grafted MMP onto an old framework relatively untouched since 1956.  It did not fully integrate the philosophy and practice of MMP and left in place First-Past-The-Post rules.

Aspects of a funding regime that have the greatest relevance to the MMP context are recognition of :

• parties as the main organising structure in elections

   

• multiple parties, both in and out of parliament

   

• the importance of the party vote

   

• voters having two votes and a third splitting them

   

Some examples from other Westminster democracies

 

Australian political parties are funded for the federal election campaign in direct relation to their electoral popularity.  The money is paid immediately after the election, so each party must fund its campaign from its own resources and will then be reimbursed depending on its vote share.  In 2004 each party received AUD$1.94 per first preference vote.  The total amount to be distributed is set by parliament and the allocation is done by the Australian Electoral Commission.  Australian MPs have a printing and a communications allowance.  Political parties and their associated entities are obliged to submit annual donation disclosure returns and there is a prohibition on anonymous gifts.  There are no campaign spending limits and no disclosure of campaign spending.

Canadian candidates and parties receive a partial reimbursement of the election expenses, related to the spending limit. Any candidate who receives 10 percent or more of the vote in his or her electoral district is eligible for the reimbursement of 60 percent of his or her election expenses and personal expenses.  Any political party which received two percent of the vote nationwide is eligible to receive a reimbursement of 50 percent of its election expenses.  Canadian parties which won two percent of the vote nationwide also receive a quarterly allowance of an annual amount equivalent to CAD$1.75 per vote received.  Campaign spending is limited using a formula that considers the number of electors and population density.  Private donations are limited to CAD$5,000 per year with no anonymous donations allowed over CAD$25.  There are extensive donation disclosure requirements.

UK parties do not receive any direct state funding for the election campaign.  Each candidate is entitled to send an election pamphlet or letter to every voter in their electorate free of charge of postage.  Each party is allocated time for ‘party political broadcasts’ on all TV channels simultaneously.  The broadcast allocation reflects their size in parliament.  Parties must report all donations in excess of £5,000 to the Electoral Commission on a quarterly basis, and on a weekly basis during elections.  Third parties that wish to spend more than £10,000 in England, or £5,000 in each of Scotland, Wales or Northern Ireland supporting or opposing a party or group of candidates must register with the Electoral Commission as a recognised third party.  There are limits on campaign expenditure by each candidate but not by the party.

New Zealand situation and recognised problems

 

State funding has two forms in New Zealand: broadcast allocation to registered parties; and support to parliamentary parties.

Radio and TV election ads by political parties are funded through the Broadcast Allocation process whereby the Electoral Commission allocates funds provided by parliament using a set of criteria specified in the Broadcasting Act.  In making this allocation the Electoral Commission is joined by two additional commissioners: one representing the government and one representing opposition parties.

Problems with the broadcast allocation regime include:

• state funding can only be used for party radio and TV election ads thus restricting parties’ choices on how to deliver their message

   

• private funding cannot be used for radio and TV election ads so parties are reliant upon the allocation to be able to advertise in these media

   

• the process is time-consuming and has high compliance costs for parties and broadcasters

   

• the criteria are unfair (parties have a range of views on what would make the criteria fairer)

   

• presence of two additional commissioners who are appointed to represent the government and opposition parties, which means the balance and nature of representation of minor and non-parliamentary parties is uncertain.

   

Parliamentarians are funded to enable communication with voters on the work that they are doing.  The Auditor General has raised concerns about the use of these funds for election campaign activity.

There are no restrictions on private donations.  There is a loose donation disclosure regime with annual disclosure for parties and after each election for candidates.  Anonymous donations are allowed.

Campaign spending is limited for both parties and candidates and all have to provide a return of their election expenses.  There is no provision for or practice of electoral agencies checking for completeness and compliance with other than the reporting provisions.  The current regime relies on electoral petitions or complaints being made to the appropriate electoral agency.

Options for change

 

A number of options from the examples provided could be adopted in New Zealand.  They and the status quo are tested against the factors outlined in the first section:

Table 1 – evaluation of option for campaign funding

Table 2 – evaluation of option for funding disclosure regime

Sources

Controller and Auditor-General, Government and parliamentary publicity and advertising June 2005
Democratic Audit of Australia
Democratic Audit
Elections Canada
Australian Electoral Commission
UK Electoral Commission

Campaign Rules

New Zealand campaign rules are complex and have not been adapted to the MMP context.  Campaign rules became one of the news stories during and after the election, as well as the subject of civil and potential criminal proceedings.

An alternative is to have one, simple definition and regime applying to election campaign material and campaigning which is applied to everyone in the election, potentially including campaigning by third parties.

Decisions on campaign rules need to consider ideas of clarity, equality of access, ease of compliance and the needs of the MMP context.

Factors to consider

 

The Democratic Audit, the main international assessment of democracy framework, lists the four principles that must be met by democratic frameworks to be:

• popular control over public decision-making

   

• political equality in exercising that control

   

• the principle of deliberative democracy [informed debate]

   

• the principle of human rights and civil liberties.

   

In relation to the rules for election campaigns these principles are met when laws and practice work to ensure:

• clarity for those who must comply with the rules and those who enforce them

   

• minimal barriers for those wishing to contest the election, including equal access to means of communicating with voters and ease of compliance

   

• minimal restrictions on individual rights to freedom of expression and access to information

   

• public confidence that those contesting the election comply with the rules and will be caught if they break them.  Clarity, ease of compliance and monitoring and coherence of all related rules assist this aim.

   

In the MMP context regulations need to fully integrate the philosophy of a proportional,  party based, multi-party electoral system and parliament.  The Electoral Act 1993,  basically grafted MMP onto an old framework relatively untouched since 1956.  It did not fully integrate the philosophy and practice of MMP.

Aspects of campaign rules that have the greatest relevance to the MMP context are recognition of :

• parties as the main organising structure in elections and parliament

   

• multiple parties, both in and out of parliament

   

• a combined campaign by parties and their candidates for the two votes

   

Some examples from other Westminster democracies

 

“The [Australian] federal parliament has determined that the Electoral Act should not regulate the content of political messages contained in electoral advertising, rather, the intent of the Electoral Act is to ensure electors are informed about the source of political advertising, and to ensure that political advertising does not mislead or deceive electors about the way in which a vote must be cast”.  An “electoral advertisement” is defined as any advertisement, in any medium, that contains electoral matter, which is defined as mater intended or likely to affect voting in an election.  The term, and thus electoral advertising, is given a very wide definition.

The Canadian definition of “election advertising” encompasses advertising during an election period that promotes or opposes a registered party or the election of a candidate, including by taking a position on an issue with which the registered party or candidate is associated.

In the UK no political advertising is allowed on TV or radio, other than the party political broadcasts which are allocated to parties.  Regulation of election advertising is contained in a number of different Acts. For the purposes of the legal requirement, promoting or procuring the election of a candidate includes material criticising or disparaging another candidate at the election.

New Zealand situation and recognised problems

 

Regulations relating to campaigning are different for candidates and parties, do not contain one clear definition on election advertising, are contained in two different Acts, and have not been fully revised to reflect the MMP context.

In our experience, issues of confusion concerning election expenses are inextricably related to issues of campaign regulation setting out, more broadly, who can do what and when.  The provisions are complex for all users: the parties and candidates who have to comply with the laws; the broadcasters who also have to comply; the public in seeking to know what is allowable and how to complain; and all of the agencies that have a role in ensuring compliance.

The information resources that were provided on the election website www.elections.org.nz in order to assist the parties, media and public in understanding the different regulations relating to the campaign illustrate the complexity of the provisions.  Attached are:

• Election broadcast advertising – overview

   

• How to run election broadcast advertising

   

• Advice for Community Access Broadcasters

   

• Election advertising rules - summary

   

Also attached is an internal table used to correctly re-direct callers who wanted to make a complaint

Particular examples of complexity are:

• Many of the rules are different for parties and electorate candidates, eg when advertising can start, if negative advertising is allowed, which funding source can be used, who receives the election expense return.

   

• Six different agencies may deal with complaints about aspects of election advertising.

   

• One activity by a party can be investigated and referred to the police by two separate agencies in respect of different aspects.

   

• The Broadcasting Act uses the term ‘election programmes’ to refer to what most of us would call ‘election broadcast advertising’ and not to what most of us would think of as an election programme, eg a debate or current affairs programme.

   

• The distinction between a current affairs programme and an ‘election programme’ is unclear to some involved (eg Community Access Broadcasters) as it depends largely upon interpretation of ‘Encourages or persuades, or appears to encourage or persuade, voters to vote for (or not to vote for) a political party or a person’.

   

• The Broadcasting Act defines broadcasting in a purely technical way which is not clearly applicable to current and converging forms of technology and advertising techniques such as the internet and mobile technologies.

   

• The definition of broadcaster means that each radio station manager is a broadcaster even though the reality of radio stations is that many are parts of a network and so the station manager has little control over advertising or programmes.  For instance for Classic Hits advertisement may be booked by local sales staff just for that location (eg Classic Hits Wellington or Classic Hits Auckland) or the booking may be accepted by the Classic Hits Network or via The Radio Bureau (an advertising wholesaler), to play on a range or all of the stations within the Classic Hits Network.  The Broadcasting Act makes station managers responsible for decisions that they do not control in practice.

   

Another aspect which caused confusion with many who called us seeking clarification was that some of the rules are in the Electoral Act and some are in the Broadcasting Act.  From our experience of those who called members of the public sought details of election rules in the Electoral Act and not in other legislation.

There is a wide variation in fines that can be applied in cases of breach of the campaign sections of the Electoral Act and the Broadcasting Act.   The range is from $100,000 to $3,000.

The campaign rules do not reflect the MMP context.  For instance the differences in campaign restrictions on candidates and parties do not reflect:

• the threshold rules, in particular when a party needs to win an electorate to gain seats

   

• the reality that most electorate candidates are campaigning for two ticks, or primarily for the party vote.

   

Options for change

 

The main alternative from the examples provided is to have a single clearly worded definition of election advertising and associated regime that is applied to all.  This option and the status quo are tested against the factors outlined in the first section:

Table 3 – evaluation of option for campaign rules

Sources

Democratic Audit of Australia
Democratic Audit
Elections Canada
Australian Electoral Commission
UK Electoral Commission  

Attachment

Election Broadcast Advertising
This document includes:
Election broadcast advertising – overview
How to run election broadcast advertising
Advise for Community Access Broadcasters at Election Time
Election advertising rules – summary
Where to ask or complain – Election ‘05

Elections Management Body structure

There are three agencies involved in general elections in New Zealand. The problems with this situation have been recognised by several different bodies.

A single elections management body is common.  In Australia the body is equivalent to an Independent Crown Entity.  In the UK the electoral management body is akin to an Officer of Parliament.

Decisions on the structure of an elections management body need to consider both democratic and public management standards.

Factors to consider

 

International standards for electoral management bodies stress independence, impartiality and transparency as distinct and interdependent attributes required for an electoral management body. 

Independence, as well as being stated in law, is ensured through four key factors: 

• how an office is filled and an incumbent removed from office

   

• mechanisms for funding decisions

   

• reporting routes

   

• internal and external conventions, practices and ethical standards. 

   

Impartiality is related to, but not the same as, independence.  The work of electoral administrators must be driven by the objective of demonstrably free and fair elections.  Impartiality is ensured through the practices and ethical standards of the electoral management body.

Transparency ensures that the public and political players can be assured that electoral management is free and fair.  Compliance is a crucial component as is the body that holds the electoral management body accountable.

None of these attributes exist by simply naming or claiming them.  They exist when different attributes of entity and environment taken together ensure that the operations of an organisation and the behaviours of the people involved serve to protect and promote it in appearance, form and action.

Public management standards for structures and operations are also important in considering the form of the electoral management body. Public sector efficiency encapsulated in the State Services Commission’s “Review of the Centre” seeks easier whole-of-government responses, enhancing institutional accountability, ensuring human resource capacity and capability is sufficient (including its ethical framework).  

One consequence of this review of public sector management was the standardisation and clarification of crown entities, including independent crown entities.

Some examples from other Westminster democracies

 

Australian Electoral Commission is an independent statutory authority with responsibility for all tasks for federal elections.  The commission reports to the special Minster for State.

Elections Canada is an independent, non-partisan agency reporting directly to Canada's parliament.  Funding for the organisation is provided directly by parliament with concurrence of Treasury ministers and the House of Commons appoints the Chief Electoral Officer to head the agency. It undertakes all work on federal elections.

UK Electoral Commission is an independent body with the mission to foster public confidence and participation by promoting integrity, involvement and effectiveness in the democratic process. Elections are run by local councils who also create the electoral roll. Commissioners are appointed by an address from the House of Commons after consultation with the leader of each parliamentary party.  The commission reports to the Speaker’s Committee in the House of Commons and receives funding via the same body.  It has been described as having the key characteristics of an Officer of Parliament.

New Zealand situation and recognised problems

 

Three agencies are involved in general elections: the Electoral Enrolment Centre, a NZ Post business unit, is responsible for maintaining the electoral roll and running the Māori electoral option; Chief Electoral Office, a Justice Ministry business unit, runs elections and services the Representation Commission; the Electoral Commission, an Independent Crown Entity,  is responsible for supervising party compliance with their statutory responsibilities and for education and information on electoral matters.  While independence provisions differ, all three agencies report to the Minister for Justice and to the Justice and Electoral Committee.  Budgets for all three come through Vote Justice.  Local body and district health board elections are run separately by local authorities.

In March 2004 the Justice and Electoral Committee (JEC) recommended a fundamental review of New Zealand’s Election Framework in the report of its Inquiry into the 2002 General Election.  The possible reform of electoral organisational structures headed the Committee’s list of matters for review and possible change. This recommendation echoed similar recommendations in the Election Framework Taskforce’s 2001 report, the JEC review of the 1999 election, the Hunn & Smith report on the 1999 election, and the recommendations of the Royal Commission of the Electoral System in 1986.

The Hunn & Smith report said “from the perspective of organisational theory there may be real advantages in a more comprehensive, co-ordinated and focused organisation…  Such an organisation is in our view more likely to be able to develop a national infrastructure to manage (whether by contract or otherwise) the functions of enrolment, election management, public education and boundary issues than is possible through fragmented organisations no matter how efficient they might separately be.  We envisage, although this would require careful consideration and would eventually be a matter for Government decision, that any such organisation would be responsible to Parliament but would otherwise be independent of political direction.”

Problems with having three separate agencies with different structures relate to missed opportunities for: a shared vision and mission; combined projects and maximising resources.  For instance goals that relate to all aspects of the election are either divided or forgotten.  Specific examples are communication with ethnic groups and encouraging electoral participation (including voter turnout).

Expertise in aspects of elections management is further divided across the agencies that run the general election and those that run local body elections.  This issue was considered by the Justice and Electoral Committee inquiry into the 2004 local body elections.  They recommended that “The Government should fund a single electoral agency to be responsible for improving voter turnout and awareness in general and local elections” and “By majority, the Government should fund a single agency to be responsible for education and information on all electoral systems used in New Zealand.”

Some options for change

 

In Canada and the UK the financial and operational accountability of the agencies to parliament is closely specified.  They have established funding mechanisms which seem to better balance the constitutional independence of electoral administration with proper prioritisation and accountability of funding from the public purse.

Currently, funding for the current three electoral agencies is provided through Vote Justice and comprises 4.7% for of the overall budget of Votes Justice and Courts administered by the re-merged Ministry of Justice based on (lower) non-election year requirements of about $30m.  Ministry budget processes, focused on core sector outcomes, make it difficult to secure additional funding unless mission critical.  Given the discrete and constitutionally important role of elections it would seem appropriate to establish Vote Electoral.  There are other output classes with smaller budgets which have a distinct vote which share similar functions or responsible ministers, such as Vote Serious Fraud at $5.635m 2004/5, Vote Parliamentary Counsel, and Vote Attorney General at $51.737m which all report to the Attorney General.  Officers of Parliament also have separate Votes, with the Speaker as Responsible Minister.

There are two aspects to the structure of the electoral management body that could be considered and each is looked at separately.  Having one agency instead of three primarily addresses public management issues whilst the structure and reporting route for the agency addresses democratic issues.  Each is tested against the factors outlined in the first section:

Table 4 – evaluation of option for number of electoral management bodies

Table  5 – evaluation of option for structure of electoral management bodies

Sources

The Commonwealth Secretariat’s GoodCommonwealth Electoral Practice – A Working Document 1997
Election Framework Taskforce, Report of the Election Framework Taskforce, June 2001, unpublished,
Oonagh Gay & Barry Winetrobe, Officers of Parliament – Transforming the role, April 2003, The Constitution Unit, School of Public Policy, UCL, London.
Don Hunn & Mel Smith, Review of General Election Process 1999, February 2000, Ministry of Justice
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, International Electoral Standards – Guidelines for reviewing the legal framework of elections, 2002
JEC,  Inquiry into the 2004 Local Authority Elections, I.7C, July 2005
JEC, Inquiry into the 2002 General Election, I.7A, March 2004
JEC, Inquiry into the 1999 General Election, I.7C, December 2001, House of Representatives.
The Royal Commission on the Electoral System, Towards a Better Democracy, H.3, December 1986.
State Services Commission Review of the Centre
Elections Canada
Australian Electoral Commission
UK Electoral Commission

Issues arising from the reports on the work of the Electoral Commission in the 2005 election

Two specific issues are raised relating directly to the reports on the 2005 election: tardy compliance for broadcaster and party election returns; the budget for future election information campaigns.

Tardy returns compliance by broadcasters and parties

As shown in the report on broadcaster election programme returns and party election expense returns, a large proportion was received late, and after a reminder letter had been sent.  Of the returns received from parties, the majority had to be returned for correction or clarification.

Compliance with the legal requirement for returns has not been timely or accurate. Checking and chasing accurate returns is time consuming and frustrating for all involved.

The Electoral Commission can refer those that do not comply to the police, but has no other means of enforcing accurate compliance by the due date.

The Electoral Commission would like to have another means of ensuring timely and accurate compliance, such as a late administration fee.

Budget for future election information campaigns

The information campaign in 2005 cost $1,167,444 (excl GST), compared to $858,000 (excl GST) in 2002.  However the increased expenditure was used primarily to cover the increased cost of placing TV advertisements.  The commission was grateful to secure additional funding of $548,000 (excl GST) in Budget 2005 which meant that the commission could plan to deliver an election information campaign of a similar budget in real terms to that delivered in 2002.

As this additional funding was a one-off and not an increase in the base-lined $500,000 (excl GST) election information funding, the commission will need to make a budget bid in the order of $5-600, 000 (excl GST) to ensure it can deliver an adequate election information programme in conjunction with the next general election.

In 2005 15% of the Electoral Commission’s expenditure occurred in the financial year preceding the one in which the election was held.  The planning and much of the production has to be in place at least six months before the last possible election day.  The Electoral Commission has repeatedly requested that funding for the election information camping is spread across the two financial years and will make this argument again in 2006.

Attached reports

Report on education and information in relation to the election
Report on understanding of MMP
Report on broadcasting allocation
Report on party and broadcaster election expense returns
Briefing to Incoming Minister, 2005